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Clearing Obstacles to Sound Tax 
Policy: The Case Against the 
Anticipatory Assignment of Income 
Doctrine in the Charitable Context 
David Frederick* 
ABSTRACT 
The Internal Revenue Code is replete with policy preferences in the form of deduc-
tions, credits, and deferrals, commonly called tax expenditures. The law prevents 
these tax expenditures from impairing the revenue function of the tax code by 
providing caps, time limits, and recapture rules that are meant to moderate their 
effects and prevent abuses. While these limitations are generally prudent, they 
themselves require frequent review to ensure they are not unduly disrupting the le-
gitimate functions of the tax code. Indeed, it is possible, perhaps common, for rea-
sonable limits on tax expenditures to evolve into unreasonable obstacles to effective 
tax strategy. 
 
This article expounds upon this disruptive evolution by examining the Anticipatory 
Assignment of Income Doctrine as one such limit that began as a reasonable guard 
against abuse, but has contorted over time into a troublesome obstacle. The context 
for this examination is a tax-saving strategy for the liquidation of a business em-
ploying a Charitable Remainder Unitrust. The tax code presents clear policy en-
dorsements for both entrepreneurs selling their businesses and for charitable gifting, 
and the Charitable Remainder Unitrust strategy is specifically established by the 
Internal Revenue Code. However, the judicially created Anticipatory Assignment 
of Income doctrine disrupts this strategy and prevents its effective usage. This arti-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “the Code”) abounds with policy pref-
erences. Famously described as “tax expenditures” by Stanley Surrey, these prefer-
ences are deeply ensconced in the Code as deductions, credits, exclusions, deferrals, 
preferential rates, and exemptions.1 A cursory review shows that Congress has used 
the IRC to favor home ownership,2 retirement savings,3 charitable giving,4 military 
service,5 higher education,6 community development,7 farming,8 and ministry of the 
gospel.9 On the one hand, the Code’s favoritism may be in support of an activity 
Congress would like to encourage, such as a deduction for charitable giving or de-
ferral for retirement savings.10 On the other hand, this favoritism is sometimes also 
a means for Congress to counter difficulties that might otherwise arise from the 
IRC, such as offering a preferred long term capital gains rate to combat capital lock-
in.11 
However, even deeply ensconced policy preferences are often limited in their 
scope or effect. While the Code offers tax expenditures for preferred behavior or to 
prevent disruptive results of its own operations, no tax expenditure offers carte 
blanche to avoid taxation.12 Nearly every benefit comes with a floor, cap, time lim-
itation, recapture rule, or prohibitive ancillary doctrine that prevents the expendi-
tures from swallowing the revenue raising ability of the IRC.13 Most of these limits 
on tax expenditures—and thus the limits on tax mitigation strategies they imply—
are written into the Code itself by Congress. However, some substantial limits on 
 
 1. STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985). (“The tax expenditure 
concept . . . consists of the special preferences found in every income tax. These provisions, often called 
tax incentives or tax subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class or persons. They take many forms, such as permanent exclusions 
from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special rates. Whatever their 
form, these departures from the normative tax structure represent government spending for favored ac-
tivities or groups, effected through the tax system rather than through direct grants, loans, or other forms 
of government assistance.”). 
 2. I.R.C. § 163(a), (h), (h)(2)(D) (2018) (taken together, the mortgage interest deduction). 
 3. I.R.C. § 219 (2018) (qualified retirement contributions to individual retirement accounts). 
 4. I.R.C. § 170 (2018) (charitable contribution deduction). 
 5. I.R.C. § 112 (2018) (exclusion of combat zone compensation for armed forces members). 
 6. I.R.C. §§ 529, 221 (2018) (exemption for qualified tuition program and deduction for student loan 
interest, respectively). 
 7. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018) (deferral of gain for investment in opportunity zones). 
 8. I.R.C. § 1301 (2018) (income averaging for farming and fishing). 
 9. I.R.C. § 107 (2018) (exclusion of parsonage rental value). 
 10. E.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to Interpret the 
Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 205 (2001) (“The Code abounds with provisions that not 
only influence economic behavior, but that also are intended to influence economic behavior.”). 
 11. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018); See also Sven-Olov Daunfeldt et al., Do High Taxes Lock-in Capital Gains? 
Evidence from a Dual Income Tax System, 145 PUB. CHOICE 25, 27 (2010) (“Our results indicate that 
higher taxes on capital gains prevent investors from realizing capital gains.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1191-
93 (1989) (discussing selective tax limitations as a mechanism for mitigating effects of tax exclusions 
and deductions). 
 13. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 219(b) (2018) (maximum deduction for qualified retirement deductions); I.R.C. 
§ 170(b) (2018) (percentage limitation for the charitable deduction); I.R.C. § 221(b) (2018) (maximum 
deduction for student loan interest); See also Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy 
Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV. 85 (1985) (examining the policy and limitations underlying tax treatment 
of charitable contributions). 
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tax strategies have also come from the courts in the form of judicial tax doctrines.14 
Courts have introduced doctrines that clarify the Code’s processes, cover gaps in its 
legislation, and commonly limit strategies available to taxpayers in the name of 
fairness.15 Historically, such judicial doctrines have helped ensure the smooth op-
eration of the tax law, especially in the earliest days of the Code when gaps and 
ambiguities were common.16 But judicial tax doctrines, like all laws, deserve regu-
lar review and subjugation to the democratic process, lest they lapse into forms that 
do more harm than good.17 
Most limits on tax expenditures and the resulting tax mitigation strategies are 
perfectly reasonable restraints. The IRC is inherently a compromise and the limits 
on tax expenditures often demonstrate the competing interests at work in the Code.18 
Effective limits help keep policy preferences in relative balance according to ar-
rangements reached in Congress. Tax expenditures can also lend themselves to 
 
 14. See Daniel M. Schneider, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided by Trial Courts, 
1993-2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35, 37–40 (2009) (analyzing the rise of 
judicial doctrines in tax cases starting with Gregory v. Helvering); See also McMahon, supra note 10, at 
195 (“The myriad of judicial doctrines that may be applied to police an overly literal application of the 
Code and regulations that could produce an absurd or unintended result cannot be neatly sorted in readily 
distinguishable piles. . . . [Some] of these doctrines, loosely speaking, can be said to be judicial tools to 
determine exactly what constitute the relevant fact findings, determined from the welter of evidence, to 
which the law in turn can be applied.”). 
 15. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 B.C. L. REV. 
587, 588 (2001) (“The use of judicial doctrines to curtail tax avoidance is pervasive in the area of income 
taxation. . .. [C]ourts believe that if the Internal Revenue Code . . . were read literally, impermissible tax 
avoidance would become the norm rather than the exception.”); Contra Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on 
Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U CHI. L. REV. 859, 880 (“A justification frequently offered for 
extrastatutory or remedial forays by the courts in tax cases is that the tax laws cannot possibly reach all 
the artful forms of transaction used by taxpayers to reduce taxes and, therefore, that the courts have an 
important function in filling gaps left open by an imperfectly expressed congressional intent. Few myths 
so persistent are as easily dispelled. It is hard to think of a single case that has ever permanently staunched 
any fissure in the congressional dyke.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (creating the Substance over Form Doctrine, 
perhaps the most famous judicial tax doctrine); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) 
(creating the Realization Event Doctrine); Commissioner v. P.G. Lake Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (creat-
ing the Acceleration of Income Doctrine). Tax doctrines can also come from Treasury Regulations in-
terpreting the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979) (creating the construc-
tive receipt doctrine). 
 17. In fact, a skeptical perspective would hold all judicial tax doctrines as inherently undemocratic 
since they only tend to arise as a tool for the government to curtail a tax-reducing transaction engaged 
by a taxpayer following a strict application of the Code’s text. See Schneider, supra note 14, at 37 (“The 
common wisdom about these judicial doctrines is that they are used only to justify decisions in favor of 
the government. They are not neutral because they cannot be used to rationalize decisions on behalf of 
the taxpayer. And, unlike [other] methods of construction . . . , they do not explicitly reach beyond the 
words of a statute, even if they set aside the effect of those words.”). Moreover, analyses have shown 
that judges tend to rely on these judicial doctrines relatively more than the actual text of the Code or 
regulations when engaging in statutory interpretation. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Inter-
pretive Regimes, 38 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1911 (2005) (“Taken as a whole, the data depict a Court 
that has privileged its own precedent and judge-made rules over the preferences of the legislative or 
executive branches.”). On the other hand, judicial doctrines themselves may also create opportunities for 
taxpayers to exploit the Code and avoid taxes in a way not available absent a given judicial doctrine. See 
Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, 70 A.B.A. J. 74, 76 (1984) (“Reli-
able maxims do not abound in the tax field, but there are a few. One relates to Moses’ rod. It reminds us 
that every stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will metamorphose sooner or later into a large 
green snake and bite the commissioner on the hind part.”). 
 18. See Tax Equity and Ad Hoc Tax Legislation, 84 HARV. L. REV. 640, 642–54 (1971) (providing an 
excellent consideration of competing interests in the Code). 
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fraud and abuse, and effective limits may curtail such improprieties.19 Moreover, 
limits are needed to maintain consistent revenue and prevent tax revenue from being 
swallowed by the tax expenditures.20 
But some limits are merely obstacles that prevent taxpayers from availing 
themselves of reasonable and policy-appropriate tax strategies.21 These obstacles 
often originate as sensible restrictions, but through changing circumstances or mis-
application to new situations, they may develop into unreasonable barriers. Such an 
otherwise worthwhile limitation becomes an obstacle when it no longer protects the 
effective functioning of the Code and the tax expenditures, but instead, disrupts the 
reasonable use of a tax expenditure. These limitations-cum-obstacles betray inad-
vertent ambiguities toward otherwise clear policy positions, disrupt reasonable use 
of expenditures, and prevent effective realization of the Code’s policy goals. Far 
from being reasonable caps and limitations, these obstacles serve only to cause un-
necessary confusion, complexity, and cost. Identifying the distinction between rea-
sonable restraints and disruptive obstacles may be more art than science. However, 
considering individual limitations on policy-based tax expenditures may expose 
those limitations that have crossed the threshold from reasonable restraint meant to 
maintain the tax base or prevent an abuse to unnecessary obstacles that only serve 
to complicate and disrupt otherwise policy-consistent use of existing tax expendi-
tures. 
This article will suggest that the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine 
is one such limit that started as a reasonable restraint on tax evasion strategies but 
has twisted and contorted through multiple iterations and restatements to rise to the 
level of a policy-disrupting obstacle. This judicial doctrine has become an inappro-
priate barrier to sound tax policy, especially in the realm of liquidating closely held 
businesses and using charitable structures to mitigate the resulting taxation. This 
article will consider a putatively effective and appropriate tax strategy for selling a 
closely held business by employing a charitable structure specifically ordained by 
the Code, but which the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine fecklessly 
disrupts. Part II of this article considers aspects of liquidating closely held busi-
nesses and tax-saving charitable strategies. Part III of this article discusses the his-
tory and development of the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine and its 
effect on charitable liquidation strategies. Part IV identifies how the Doctrine inter-
feres with the charitable liquidation structure and suggests remedies. Finally, Part 
V of this article concludes with perspectives on tax expenditures and their appro-
priate limitations. 
 
 19. See Ian Ayres & Robert McGuire, Using the False Claims Act to Remedy Tax-Expenditure Fraud, 
66 DUKE L.J. 535 (2016). 
 20. See generally Martin Feldstein, Raising Revenue by Limiting Tax Expenditures, 29 TAX POL’Y. & 
THE ECON. 1 (2015). 
 21. See, e.g., Ramsay H. Slugg, Good Deeds Done Badly: Charitable Giving Missteps, 44 EST. PLAN. 
12, 13 (2017) (“One result of all of the rules surrounding the federal income tax charitable deduction is 
a greater opportunity to inadvertently run afoul of those rules. The author is not talking about intentional 
abusive transactions[.] Rather, the more rules that exist, the more opportunities there are to make a mis-
take.”). 
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II. CHARITABLE STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS LIQUIDATION 
A. General Considerations for Selling a Business 
Closely held business owners often spend their lives building the value of their 
companies.22 Forgoing traditional wage and employment relationships, business 
owners embrace extra risks attendant to developing an enterprise and competing in 
the market.23 While owning and running a successful business can be lucrative, for 
many business owners the end goal of building a company is realizing the fruit of 
their labor through a sale and exit.24 However, while a sale may mean a large payday 
and the start of retirement, it can also mean a substantial income tax burden for the 
seller.25 Business owners often have a low basis in their business, especially if the 
business had ever been incorporated as a pass-through entity and the owner took 
deductions for losses and capital depreciation.26 This means that for many owners, 
the entire sales price of their company may come as taxable gains.27 If the income 
tax burden is too high, the owner may choose not to sell at all and may become 
locked-in to the business.28 
The Code has several provisions designed to mitigate some of this tax burden 
and prevent lock-in. First, and perhaps most notably, the long-term capital gains tax 
rate is set substantially below the ordinary income tax rate.29 This rather broad relief 
to capital lock-in applies not only to the seller of a closely held business but also to 
any taxpayer selling a capital asset.30 The Code further offers § 1202, which ex-
cludes a substantial portion (or potentially all) of the gain from a sale of a qualified 
small business, albeit as a very hard-to-hit target for maximum tax relief.31 The 
 
 22. Tobias J. Moskowitz & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Returns to Entrepreneurial Investment: 
A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 745, 750-53 (2002) (defining a closely-held 
business as an incorporated entity, that is not a personal service business, and that has at least 50% of its 
outstanding ownership shares owned by five or fewer individuals.). INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 542, CORPORATIONS (2019) (This article uses closely-held business 
owner to mean the controlling owner (or sole owner) of a closely-held business. This definition is less 
formal, but is held consistently throughout the article.). 
 23. Lowell W. Busenitz, Entrepreneurial Risk and Strategic Decision Making: It’s a Matter of Per-
spective, 35 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 325, 326 (1999). 
 24. See generally Dawn R. DeTienne, Entrepreneurial Exit as a Critical Component of the Entrepre-
neurial Process: Theoretical Development, 25 J. BUS. VENTURING 203, 211 (2010) (discussing the im-
portance of planning for a business sale and exit as part of the entrepreneurial process). 
 25. In general, closely-held business interests will qualify as “capital assets” under I.R.C. § 1221 and 
their sale will be taxable according to terms laid out in §§ 1, 1001, 1222, and other relevant provisions. 
See I.R.C. § 1221 (2017); I.R.C. § 1 (2019); I.R.C. § 1001 (1993); I.R.C. § 1222 (2014). 
 26. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 1011. 
 27. This taxable gain may include basis recapture taxed as ordinary income—not preferred long term 
capital gains rates—if the business has been taking depreciation deductions and the sale is structured as 
an assets sale. See I.R.C. § 1250 (2018). 
 28. Sven-Olov Daunfeldt et al., supra note 11, at 27 (“Our results indicate that higher taxes on capital 
gains prevent investors from realizing capital gains.”); See also Zhonglan Dai et al., Capital Gains Taxes 
and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-In? 63 J. OF FIN. 709, 713 (2008). 
 29. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2019). 
 30. I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. 
 31. I.R.C. § 1202 contains several substantial restraints which tend to limit this rather striking section’s 
actual effectiveness. For instance, a taxpayer hoping to avail him or herself of the benefits of § 1202 
generally must hold the business stock for at least five years before the sale (§ 1202(a)(1)), be the original 
incorporator of the business (§ 1202(c)), and is limited by a cap on the excludible income (§ 1202(b). 
Yet the harshest restriction arguably comes with § 1202(c)(2)(A), which requires the business to have 
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Code also endorses certain types of business sales with tax relief, such as a sale to 
an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”) with § 1042 allowing for the non-
recognition of gain when the sale proceeds are reinvested.32 These provisions seem 
to collectively indicate that the Code favors business liquidations, at least insofar as 
to allow a closely held business owner to sell and exit his or her firm. 
Selling a business is complex work, and the act can take many forms. A busi-
ness owner may sell to a partner, a family member, a third party, or the public at 
large through an initial public offering.33 A sale can be in the form of a stock sale, 
asset sale, or statutory merger.34 In exchange for his or her stock or assets, the seller 
may accept cash, debt, equity in the purchaser, or a combination thereof.35 Some 
sales close very quickly with the buyer and seller parting ways, but other sales fea-
ture earn-out structures and consulting restrictions that may take several years to 
fully complete.36 Additionally, some corporate forms are easier to sell than others. 
C Corps offer maximum flexibility in who can be a shareholder as well as sale 
structures and strategies, while S Corps are severely restricted as to who can be 
owners and therefore can be much more difficult to sell.37 With all of these varia-
tions, there is no such thing as a standard business sale. Instead there are nearly 
endless permutations of structures and strategies for passing a business from party 
to party in exchange for consideration. 
When this article describes a business sale, it means a sale of 100% of C Corp 
stock as a going concern from one individual to a third party in exchange for cash 
at the time of closing. This sale avoids the relative complexities of trying to sell an 
S Corp’s stock,38 or of marshalling together all the corporate assets, dividing the 
sales price amongst them, and effectively retitling them to the buyer in an asset 
sale.39 Most importantly, this sale structure is likely to result in immediate, 
 
always been a C corporation. This greatly disrupts the common strategy of commencing a small business 
as an S Corp, growing the business under the relative benefits of a pass-through tax regime, then revoking 
the S Corp election under § 1362(d)(1)(B) and converting to a C Corp ahead of a sale, and then selling 
the corporate stock under the far less restrictive ownership rules of C Corp. 
 32. Under I.R.C. § 1042, a “leveraged ESOP” can be an excellent way for a closely-held business 
owner to exit the business and diversify his or her investment without realizing taxable gain, though 
basis-carryover rules keep the gain in place to be realized later. For more on this structure, see Sarah J. 
Westendorf, Compensation Through Ownership: The Use of the ESOP in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 195 (2006). 
 33. See E. THOM RUMBERGER, JR., THE ACQUISITION AND SALE OF EMERGING GROWTH COMPANIES: 
THE M&A EXIT §1.1 ( 2d ed. 2018). 
 34. See id. § 5.2; See also Jeffrey L Kwall, What is a Merger?: The Case for Taxing Cash Mergers 
Like Stock Sales, 32 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2006) (discussing the relative tax discrepancy between the three 
sale forms, despite the identical outcome from each transaction.). 
 35. See E. THOM RUMBERGER, JR., THE ACQUISITION AND SALE OF EMERGING GROWTH COMPANIES: 
THE M&A EXIT §5.34 (2d ed. 2018). 
 36. See id. § 5.38. 
 37. I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2018). S Corp stock can only be held by 1) one hundred shareholders or fewer, 
2) individuals or specialized trusts, and 3) American citizens or residents. The one hundred shareholder 
cap means that an S Corp cannot be publicly traded or liquidate with an initial public offering. Also, as 
a general matter, corporate entities cannot acquire the stock of S Corps. An S Corp can revoke its S Corp 
election under I.R.C. § 1362(d), become a C Corp, and avail itself of a larger market for its stock. In fact, 
it is a common exit strategy for a business that begins life as an S Corp, grows successfully, and converts 
to a C Corp for a private sale, merger, or initial public offering. But it also means that many potential 
buyers hoping to acquire a pass-through corporation cannot do so by way of a stock acquisition, which 
thus tends to limit the market for such stock. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See William W. Potter, Section 338(h)(10) Elections of S Corporations, Incremental Costs, and 
Considerations Following Tax Reform, 45 CORP. TAX. 1, 4 (“An actual asset sale can be impractical and 
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maximum taxable gain to the seller. Whereas sales that involve stock swaps may 
avoid taxation,40 and sales involving take-back debt may draw the gain out over 
time,41 an “all cash up front” sale is likely to give the seller an income spike and an 
attendant tax spike. A seller may find it worthwhile to alleviate such an income tax 
spike using any tool available. 
B. Basic Charitable Structure 
One such tool for income tax mitigation may be the use of charitable structures. 
Non-profit institutions have a special place in the Code. Not only are they tax ex-
empt,42 but contributions to charitable entities are deductible,43 and bequests to 
charities will lower the size of taxable estates.44 Moreover, charitable organizations 
are flexible and range in size and structure from small charitable trusts,45 to private 
foundations,46 to massive operating charities.47 Charities are certainly not offered 
free rein in the Code; they must contend with strict oversight of their operations and 
purpose,48 limitations on deductions for donors,49 and ancillary rules that may tax 
some of their income.50 Even in light of these reasonable limitations and restrictions, 
several charitable structures that are deeply entrenched and well endorsed by the 
policies of the Code provide powerful mechanisms for mitigating tax burdens.51 
The basic tax strategy for using a charitable structure to mitigate the tax from 
the sale of an appreciated asset is straightforward. A business owner must simply 
contribute some of his or her shares to a tax-exempt entity ahead of the sale and 
 
time consuming, involving the retitling of assets and renegotiation of certain contracts and governmental 
permits. Additionally, in an asset sale, the selling corporation may remain responsible for past liabili-
ties[.]”); RICHARD D. BLAU ET AL., S CORPORATIONS FEDERAL TAXATION §§ 15.1 (2019) (“But asset 
sales are not always possible. There may be nontransferable contracts, licenses or other assets that cannot 
be transferred or cannot be transferred quickly enough in the particular transactional context . . . . Or, it 
may simply be that a stock sale, given the magnitude or condition of title to the assets is required as a 
practical matter.”). 
 40. I.R.C. § 354(a) (1998). 
 41. I.R.C. § 453(a) (2004). 
 42. I.R.C. § 501 (2019). 
 43. I.R.C. § 170 (2019). 
 44. I.R.C. § 2055 (2019). 
 45. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 664 (2018). 
 46. I.R.C. § 509 (2006). 
 47. For example, the United Way Worldwide has a total revenue just under $4 billion and Feeding 
America has total revenue of more than $2.7 billion. See The 100 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/top-charities/list/#tab:rank. 
 48. See generally Maxwell B. Kallenberger, Policing Charitable Organizations: Whose Responsibil-
ity is it? 76 LA. L. REV. 661, 669 (2015). 
 49. I.R.C. § 170(b) (2019). 
 50. I.R.C. § 511. 
 51. For instance, the Charitable Lead Trust is a split interest gift to a charitable entity and taxable 
person that can mitigate both the Gift Tax and Estate Tax. See I.R.C. § 2522(c)(2)(B); See also I.R.C. § 
2055(e)(2)(B). Also, the Donor Advised Fund allows a taxpayer to make a deductible contribution to a 
charitable fund while maintaining reasonable control over the investments and distributions of that fund. 
See I.R.C. § 4966. Moreover, these charitable strategies can be used in combination with each other to 
maximize donor control and charitable benefit, while minimizing a donor’s tax burdens. For example, 
some donor’s find great success with a Charitable Lead Trust that pays its charitable contributions into 
a Donor Advised Fund controlled by the donor. Or consider the combination of a Charitable Remainder 
Unitrust that pays its charitable remainder into a private foundation that the donor’s family or other heirs 
control. See infra notes 55–56. 
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likely garner a charitable deduction for the contribution.52 Crucially, the sale to the 
third-party buyer can then be completed with the charity standing in as the seller 
instead of the taxable owner. As the charity is tax exempt, it will realize no tax at 
the time of the sale and will be entitled to keep the full sale proceeds.53 
In this most basic form, the tax strategy may be unappealing to a business 
owner. The notion of mitigating income tax and benefiting a favored charity may 
be appealing, but few are the business owners who will hand their companies over 
to the United Way or the Red Cross ahead of a sale. The value would be entirely 
unlikely to flow back to the owner.54 For the strategy to be effective as a profitable 
exit, the business owner must be able to participate in reaping the value from the 
sale of the business along with the charitable entity. This is what makes the Chari-
table Remainder Unitrust and some other charitable structures so valuable.55 These 
structures are established by the terms of the Code, and each could be used as part 
of a sale strategy to mitigate income taxes and provide a benefit for charitable enti-
ties, all while allowing the owner to enjoy the benefits of his or her lifetime’s in-
vestment. 
In considering the Code’s favorable treatment for owners selling closely held 
businesses as well as the tax preference for non-profit organizations,56 it seems that 
Congress would especially favor business owners who utilize charitable structures 
to mitigate the tax resulting from the sale of their firms while sharing in the benefits. 
And yet, although these tools are fully consistent with the policies of the underlying 
 
 52. I.R.C. § 170 (2019). However, under § 170(e), such charitable deduction may be limited to the 
donor’s basis in the asset contributed if the contribution is being made to a private foundation under § 
509(a). Moreover, a business owner will likely need a qualified appraisal of his or her shares ahead of 
the contribution to secure the deduction at market value. I.R.C. § 170(f)(11). Of course, a business owner 
with an offer in hand to buy his or her business should not have a hard time convincing a qualified 
appraiser of the fair market value of his business. 
 53. See Daniel Haleperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of 
Built-in Gains¸56 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2002); Joel S. Newman, Sales and Donations of Self-Created Art, 
Literature, and Music, 12 PITT. TAX REV. 57, 62–67 (offering an effective history of the tax treatment 
of contributions of appreciated property); Henry Ordower, Charitable Contribution of Services: Chari-
table Gift Planning for Nonitemizers, 67 TAX LAW. 517, 522–23 (2014) (“The charitable exclusion re-
sults from the failure of the income tax to impute taxable gain to the contributing taxpayer from the 
appreciated property at any time--not upon contribution and not upon sale of the property by the charity 
. . . . Even if the charity sells the contributed property immediately following the contribution, neither 
the contributing taxpayer nor the charity recognizes gain on the contribution or from the contribu-
tion[.]”). 
 54. Any tax exempt organization that does allow the value of the liquidation to flow back to the donor, 
without special authorization from the Code, probably will not be tax exempt for long considering the 
private benefit rules baked into I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 55. I.R.C. § 664 (2018). For instance, a private foundation structure will allow a business owner to 
contribute his or her business to the charitable structure, liquidate the business tax-free, and then pay 
some of the proceeds back to the owner as earned income for services in running the foundation. This 
option has much to recommend it as it allows business owners to become active and engaged philanthro-
pists in retirement as well as create a legacy that secures employment for family members while allowing 
the family name to be remembered for charitable endeavors. Several notable business owners have fol-
lowed this path, notably Bill Gates in his exit from Microsoft to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
See Devin Thorpe, The Real Reason the World Will Remember Bill Gates (Hint: It’s not Windows 8), 
FORBES (Sept. 5, 2012, 10:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2012/09/05/the-real-rea-
son-bill-gates-the-world-will-remember-bill-gates-hint-its-not-windows-8/#70551141a00f. Of course, 
the private foundation strategy has limitations of its own, notably the restriction that appreciated assets, 
such as closely-held stock, being deductible only to the extent of its basis and not fair market value. 
I.R.C. 170(e) (2019). Consideration of the private foundation strategy and its attendant limitations are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 29–32, 42–51. 
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tax expenditures, ancillary tax rules have created obstacles that severely disrupt 
their effective use. Eliminating these obstacles may free up key strategies that will 
help catalyze business sales and provide increased contributions to charitable enti-
ties. 
C. The Charitable Remainder Unitrust 
The Charitable Remainder Unitrust (“CRUT”) is expressly established by IRC 
§ 664.57 With a CRUT structure, a grantor creates a trust whereby the trustee pays 
a percentage of the trust assets back to the grantor (and his or her spouse, if desired) 
for a specified time (usually through the life of the second to die of the grantor and 
spouse) and then pays the remainder to a charitable entity when the trust termi-
nates.58 The CRUT can be an effective way to liquidate an appreciated asset because 
the CRUT itself is exempt from income tax.59 With this strategy, a business owner 
could establish a CRUT, contribute some (or all) of his or her closely held stock to 
the trust, and proceed with a sale of the business to a third party with the CRUT as 
the new seller. The CRUT does not pay income taxes on any gains realized from 
the sale.60 In addition, the CRUT can invest the sale proceeds into the market where 
its portfolio will likewise grow income tax free.61 
For purposes of administering CRUT requirements, the Code assumes the 
trust’s assets will grow at a predetermined rate defined in § 7520.62 With this statu-
tory growth rate in mind, the CRUT must payout a predetermined percentage of its 
assets (between 5% and 50%) every year to the grantor, and payments must be set 
such that the charity is actuarially expected to receive at least 10% of the CRUT’s 
initial holdings at the end of the CRUT’s term.63 Under these reasonable restrictions, 
CRUTs can be (and often are) “optimized” to return the maximum amount to the 
grantor and leave as close to 10% for the charity as can be actuarially determined.64 
Distributions from the CRUT back to the grantor will be taxable and maintain the 
tax characteristics they developed in the CRUT, resulting in tax deferral, not tax 
forgiveness, for such distributions.65 When the CRUT term expires, typically upon 
 
 57. For a detailed analysis of the CRUT structure see Paul D. Callister, Charitable Remainder Trusts: 
An Overview, 51 TAX LAW. 549 (1998). 
 58. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2018). 
 59. § 664(c)(1). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(D) (2018); Trent S. Kiziah & Ryan Velo-Simpson, A Proposal to Resuscitate 
the Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 21, 26 (2016). 
 63. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(A) and (D). 
 64. See Kiziah & Velo-Simpson, supra note 62, at 26 (“[S]ome grantors will establish a CRT in order 
to maximize its payout rate while staying within the requirements, so as to provide the greatest current 
benefit, yet still retain the tax-exempt status of a CRT.”). 
 65. § 664(b). That a CRUT’s income benefits from tax deferral, but not tax forgiveness, is itself a very 
reasonable cap on the power of a CRUT. Without the presence of § 664(b), the tax mitigating power of 
the CRUT (and CRAT) would be immense. With such tax forgiveness available, the CRUT structure 
could run amok and it is not unreasonable to believe that a host of liquidations would take place in short 
term CRUT structures with high distribution rates back to grantors. Grantors certainly prefer to pay 10% 
to a charity at the end of a short term CRUT rather than 23.8% to the government at the time of liquida-
tion. Consequently, § 664(b) is a good and proper limitation on a CRUT structure’s effectiveness and its 
restrictions should remain a key aspect of the CRUT strategy. 
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the latter death of either the grantor and his or her spouse, the CRUT pays over all 
remaining assets to the charity selected by the grantor.66 
The true power of the CRUT lies in the fact that over the long run this strategy 
will bring higher returns on a business sale to a third-party purchaser than an out-
right, fully taxable sale. Consider an example: 
A 65-year-old business owner (with a 65-year-old spouse) has arranged to sell 
a business, with a tax basis of $0 and a fair market value of $10 million, to a third 
party according to the terms of a business sale outlined supra. In a fully taxable sale 
with a total tax rate of 23.8%,67 the owner will net $7.62 million. He could then 
invest the proceeds into a taxable account that grows at an assumed rate of 6% per 
year, paying tax on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends as it grows.68 
With a good payday for his business and reasonable returns on subsequent invest-
ments, the business owner would do pretty well in retirement. 
On the other hand, the business owner could put his shares into a CRUT he 
established prior to the arranged sale. With a § 7520 rate of 3.4%,69 the CRUT is 
“optimized” and termed for two lives who are each aged 65, resulting in a payout 
rate of 11.288% per year.70 The CRUT would make the sale on the grantor’s behalf, 
realize the full $10 million, invest in a portfolio earning 6% per year, and make its 
distributions to the grantor at the end of each year, starting at the end of the first 
year. As each distribution is entirely gain in the hands of the CRUT, each distribu-
tion will be fully taxable as capital gains to the grantor.71 The grantor would take in 
distributions, pay the tax, and invest the remainder into a taxable account. The tax-
able account would likewise grow at 6% per year and the grantor would pay tax on 
long-term capital gains and qualified dividends as these investments grow. 
Comparing these two scenarios, the owner making the taxable sale starts off in 
a better position by taking in a large lump sum following the sale, while the grantor 
of the CRUT takes in nothing initially. But, due to the constant stream of tax-pre-
ferred returns from the CRUT, the amount available to the owner using the CRUT 
strategy grows at a faster rate than the funds resulting from the taxable sale. Within 
 
 66. This charitable remainder also keeps the assets in the CRUT out of the grantor’s estate for estate 
tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2019). 
 67. 20% top marginal tax rate for long term capital gains (I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(d)) plus 3.8% Unearned 
Income Medicare Contribution (I.R.C. § 1411). For simplicity, state and local taxes are assumed to be 
zero. 
 68. It is possible that the owner turned investor could invest in accounts that do not produce any div-
idends or capital gains, but merely provide deferred growth appreciation throughout. Such an investment 
scheme seems highly unlikely and unadvisable in all but the most outlying of circumstances. 
 69. This is the § 7520 rate for January 2019. See Section 7520 Interest Rates, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/section-7520-interest-rates (last up-
dated Feb. 19, 2020). The higher the § 7520 rate available, the greater the distribution the CRUT can 
make back to the grantor and still be qualified as tax exempt. The greater the distribution, the quicker 
the CRUT strategy surpasses the outright sale strategy in total returns, as discussed infra. 
 70. Calculation of the optimized CRUT payout rate is complex and requires either 1) a sophisticated 
understanding of I.R.C. § 7520, the unitrust and valuation process outlined in 26 CFR 25.2512-5, the 
valuation tables contained in 26 CFR 20.2031-7, and a working understanding of linear interpolation 
calculations; or 2) an effective tax planning calculator. The calculator used for the purposes of this article 
is contained in Brentmark’s Estate Planning Tools software, available for purchase at BRENTMARK, 
https://www.brentmark.com/software/estate-planning/estate-planning-tools (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
 71. I.R.C. § 664(b) (2018). 
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21 years the total return of the CRUT strategy to the owner will exceed the total 
return of a taxable sale.72  
Total Return to Seller: CRUT Sale v. Taxable Sale73 
End of Year CRUT Sale Total Return to the Seller 
Taxable Sale 
Total Return to the Seller 
1 $911,754.34 $7,968,386.40 
5 $4,458,024.68 $9,528,664.64 
10 $8,852,483.86 $11,915,413.37 
15 $13,479,905.39 $14,899,997.13 
20 $18,628,373.89 $18,632,162.19 
21 $19,746,529.60 $19,484,024.64 
25 $24,597,314.50 $23,299,163.40 
30 $31,716,434.75 $29,135,159.39 
 
Expressed graphically, the long-run benefits of the CRUT strategy over an out-
right taxable sale are apparent: 
 
 
 72. As a side note, the strategy does not work with a Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust (“CRAT”), 
also expressly instituted by I.R.C. §664. The CRAT pays the grantor a set annuity amount every year, 
rather than a set proportion of its assets. As such, the grantor is unable to participate in the upside of the 
CRAT’s tax-preferred market growth and is limited in total benefit it offers to the grantor. CRATs also 
suffer from a “probability of exhaustion” problem that CRUTs do not, and which may affect their tax 
exempt status, making their implementation as an actuarial matter quite tricky. See Kiziah & Velo-Simp-
son, supra note 62, at 26. For these reasons, CRATs are not the preferred charitable strategy for business 
liquidation. 
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Contributing stock to a CRUT ahead of a liquidation is an effective way for a 
business owner to potentially realize a larger return from the sale of his or her busi-
ness over the long run, while benefitting from the dual tax policies of increasing 
charitable giving and aiding business owners in their liquidations.74 Of course, con-
tributing the business to the CRUT also results in a gift to charity at the end of the 
trust’s term that may not have occurred with a taxable sale. While there are other 
sale strategies that incorporate charity, when this article refers to a charitable liqui-
dation strategy, it is meant to refer to this CRUT strategy. The only problem with 
the CRUT strategy is that if it is implemented correctly, it almost certainly violates 
the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine.75 
III. THE ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE 
A. Evolution of the Doctrine 
The Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine (“AAI Doctrine” or “the 
Doctrine”) is a judicial construct from the early days of the income tax that cannot 
be traced directly back to the Code. While it started as a reasonable restriction meant 
to prevent bracket manipulation of earned income, it eventually grew to disrupt and 
curtail myriad other transactions, including certain charitable contributions, many 
with otherwise legitimate means and ends. Reciting the AAI Doctrine clearly can 
be difficult because this doctrine covers several disparate transactions, including 
some applications that are justifiable and others that are far less so. For the purposes 
of this article, the basic AAI Doctrine states that if a taxpayer has a right to the 
proceeds from labor performed or the disposition of property and transfers that right 
by either assigning the earned income or gifting the property ahead of the realization 
to a third party, then the transaction is deemed an anticipatory assignment of in-
come, the transfer is effectively nullified for tax purposes, and the income is taxable 
to the attempted transferor.76 This part will briefly trace the historical development 
of the AAI Doctrine and demonstrate how it has grown (or mutated) beyond its 
purpose. This part will also demonstrate that the AAI Doctrine needs to be com-
pletely reconsidered in the present tax environment, especially in the context of gifts 
to charity. 
The AAI Doctrine was first introduced by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl 
as a mechanism to prevent tax avoidance and bracket manipulations, especially 
 
 74. See J. Eric Sims, CRAT, CRUT, NiCRUT, and NimCRUT: Vehicles for High Net Worth Clients, 
99 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 31, 31 (July 2017) (“Charitable Remainder Trusts (CRTs) are very 
useful financial arrangements for individuals who hold highly appreciated assets and who want to make 
tax deductible charitable donations, while avoiding the associated capital gains taxes.”); See also Brett 
M. Larson & Nathan J. Nelson, CRTS: A Powerful Tool for Income-Tax Planning, 72 BENCH AND B. 
MINN. 22, 23–24 (April 2015). 
 75. Slugg, supra note 21, at 5 (“A commonly encountered issue is that of pre-arranged sales. These 
arrangements implicate the assignment of income doctrine, which attributes income back to the eco-
nomic owner of the income even if the asset generating the income has been transferred. This is most 
often encountered in either indirect-giving situations, to private foundations or donor advised funds, or 
split-interest-giving arrangements, such as charitable remainder trusts (CRTs) or charitable gift annui-
ties.”). 
 76. This is a composite definition that has been pieced together from many cases over the Doctrine’s 
lifespan. See e.g. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 
(1940); Rollins v. United States, 302 F.Supp. 812 (1969); Ferguson v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 244 (1997). 
12
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 43
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss1/43
No. 1] Frederick: Clearing Obstacles to Sound Tax Policy 71 
within a family.77 In Lucas, a husband and wife entered into a binding contract 
whereby all the husband’s earned salary and professional fee income would be di-
vided equally between the two.78 In light of this contract, the taxpayers argued that 
half of the income should be taxed to the husband and the other half should be taxed 
to the wife, who was ostensibly in a lower tax bracket.79 The Court rejected this 
assignment of the husband’s income: 
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned 
them, and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory ar-
rangements and contracts, however skillfully devised, to prevent the salary 
when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That 
seems to us the import of the statute before us, and we think that no dis-
tinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement 
by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they 
grew.80 
As it applies to earned income, the AAI Doctrine is eminently reasonable. 
Strangely, the Lucas version of the AAI Doctrine pertaining to the assignment of 
earned income prior to its payment has not been formally incorporated into the Code 
through either legislation or regulation.81 As such, the Lucas statement remains the 
much-cited authority for this version of the AAI Doctrine, which will be known 
here as the “Earned AAI Doctrine.” Despite not being codified, the Earned AAI 
Doctrine has become a staple of American tax law, and earned income diversion 
schemes that would challenge it have become rare.82 
A decade after the Court established the Earned AAI Doctrine, the Court in 
Helvering v. Horst expanded the AAI doctrine to include the assignment of un-
earned income.83 In Horst, a father gifted negotiable interest coupons to his son 
shortly before payment on the coupons was due.84 When the obligor made payment 
on the coupons, the father argued that it was his son—again, likely in a lower tax 
bracket than the taxpayer—who incurred the income and thus the tax.85 To the con-
trary, the Court held that payment on the transferred coupons would accrue to the 
father, and not his lower-taxed son. Specifically, the Court held that 
the purpose of the statute to tax the income to him who earns or creates 
and enjoys it [cannot] be escaped by “anticipatory arrangements . . . 
 
 77. Lucas v. Earl, 281 US 111, 115 (1930). 
 78. Id. at 113–14. 
 79. Id. at 113. 
 80. Id. at 114–15; See also Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932) (applying the AAI Doctrine 
where the assignment of earned income preceded the rendering of services that would earn the income). 
 81. See generally MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5.23 (2019) (outlining the Antic-
ipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine with no reference to statute or regulation). 
 82. See Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion Over the Assignment of 
Income Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 623, 628 (1993) (“[T]he assignment 
of income doctrine [states] one is taxable on all income earned through one’s personal services, regard-
less of who actually receives that income. This principle is so deeply embedded in our tax jurisprudence 
it is difficult to consider it afresh.”). Though rare, taxpayers still make the occasional attempt to assign 
earned income for tax purposes. See, e.g., Zaal v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2532 (1998). 
 83. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 121 (1940). 
 84. Id. at 114. 
 85. Id. 
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however skillfully devised” to prevent the income from vesting even for a 
second in the donor. Nor is it perceived that there is any adequate basis for 
distinguishing between the gift of interest coupons here and a gift of salary 
or commissions.86 
The rule stated in Horst may be reasonably known as the “Unearned AAI Doc-
trine.” The policy behind the Unearned AAI Doctrine—preventing bracket manip-
ulation within a family through the gifting of income producing or appreciated as-
sets ready for sale—is also eminently reasonable. However, while a judicially-cre-
ated Unearned AAI Doctrine may have been necessary early in the life of the in-
come tax, the rule has been largely subsumed by new rules in the Code itself. For 
instance, the gift tax,87 kiddie tax,88 and the advent of married filing jointly status89 
all address problems of bracket manipulation strategies taxpayers may pursue with 
their family and friends. These are all appropriate measures to prevent bracket ma-
nipulation, and though they should have largely replaced the Unearned AAI Doc-
trine, the judicially-made Doctrine and the statutory rules continue in equal force. 
While the AAI Doctrine seemed appropriate in the context of taxpayers trying 
to shift income to lower-income family and friends and was reinforced by similar 
policies in the Code, the Doctrine eventually expanded to include anticipatory as-
signment of income to charities, referred to here as the “Charitable AAI Doctrine.”90 
This application of the Doctrine is really just an offshoot of the Unearned AAI Doc-
trine whereby a taxpayer transfers productive or appreciated assets to a tax-exempt 
entity, rather than another taxpayer, in hopes of eliminating taxes arising from the 
assets’ unearned income. Upon the creation of the Charitable AAI Doctrine, this 
once unquestioned and rather innocuous judicial canon embarked on an expedition 
of disruption to the carefully and statutorily balanced realm of non-profit tax ex-
emptions and deductions. Since this expansion of the AAI Doctrine, in-kind chari-
table gifts have become much more complex and uncertain.91 
The Supreme Court has restricted its application of the AAI Doctrine to trans-
fers of income between individuals, generally within families, and has not yet em-
braced the Charitable AAI Doctrine.92 Indeed, the misadventure of the AAI Doc-
trine into the charitable realm arises entirely from the jurisprudence of circuit courts 
and the Tax Court. Tracing the precise course of that misadventure is difficult. It 
appears the first such application of the AAI Doctrine to charitable contributions 
occurred in the early 1960s (two decades after Horst) with Friedman v. Commis-
sioner.93 Other applications of the Charitable AAI Doctrine quickly followed, with 
cases such as Hudspeth v. United States,94 Kinsey v. Commissioner,95 and Jones v. 
 
 86. Id. at 120. For an excellent analysis of Horst, see Jerome M. Hesch & David J. Herzig, Helvering 
v. Horst: Gifts of Income from Property, 42 ACTECT L.J. 35 (Spring 2016). 
 87. I.R.C. § 2501 (2015). 
 88. I.R.C. § 1(g) (2019). 
 89. I.R.C. § 6013 (2013). 
 90. See, e.g., Estate of Applestein v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 80 T.C. 331, 342–43 (Tax 1983). 
 91. See generally Slugg, supra note 21, at 15. 
 92. See e.g., Comm’r Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 68 S.Ct. 715, 725 (1948); Comm’r Internal Reve-
nue v. Culbertson, 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1211 (1949). 
 93. Friedman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 428, 436 (1963), aff’d, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965). 
 94. Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 95. Kinsey v. Comm’r, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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United States.96 However, possibly due to the lack of Supreme Court involvement, 
the Charitable AAI Doctrine was not applied consistently.97 Consequently, numer-
ous cases containing similar facts that arguably should have been considered antic-
ipatory assignments to charities escaped the repercussions of the Doctrine. For in-
stance, courts held that the Charitable AAI Doctrine did not apply in Grove v Com-
missioner,98 Crosby v. United States,99 Sheppard v. United States,100 and Wekesser 
v. Commissioner.101 On the whole, the early landscape of the Charitable AAI Doc-
trine was one of confusion and inconsistent application.102 
B. The Palmer Rule and Revenue Ruling 78-197 
A clarifying decision for the Charitable AAI Doctrine came in Palmer v. Com-
missioner.103 In Palmer, the individual taxpayer owned stock in a company which 
he fully controlled.104 The taxpayer also controlled a non-profit, tax-exempt foun-
dation.105 On August 31, 1966, the taxpayer gifted a substantial portion of his com-
pany stock to the foundation and took a charitable deduction for the gift.106 The very 
next morning, at 10:00 a.m., the board of directors of the company (with the tax-
payer as chairman) convened and offered to redeem the stock from the founda-
tion.107 At 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, the trustees of the foundation (which again in-
cluded the taxpayer as chairman) accepted the offer of the company and allowed 
the stock to be redeemed under its terms.108 The taxpayer did not include the gain 
on the sale of stock that took place within the foundation as taxable income.109 Nat-
urally, the IRS invoked the Charitable AAI Doctrine and argued that the gain from 
the sale of stock should be attributed to the taxpayer and not to the foundation.110 
The Tax Court considered the IRS’s argument under the AAI Doctrine and the 
related but distinct “Step Transaction” Doctrine.111 The Tax Court noted that the 
IRS had often attacked such transactions in recent cases, saying “[s]imilar attacks 
have been presented by the [IRS] in a variety of cases involving gifts of stock fol-
lowed by its redemption, and the attacks have generally been rejected by the 
 
 96. Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 97. See, e.g., J. Drew Diamond, Taxpayers Liable for Gain in Stock Donated to Charity During a 
Tender Offer: Ferguson v. Commissioner, 51 TAX LAW. 441, 444 (1998) (“[T]he evolution of the doc-
trine of anticipatory assignment of income has been fact driven, with each new case adding a gloss 
peculiar to its own unique circumstances. As such a piecemeal product, the doctrine required extensive 
reengineering for the particulars of the [present] facts, which differed considerably from the prior 
cases[.]”). 
 98. Grove v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 490 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 99. Crosby v. United States, No. 72S-39(N), 1973 WL 528, at *14 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 23, 1973). 
 100. Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 973–82 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
 101. See Wekesser v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 35 T.C.M (CCH) 936 (1976). 
 102. See Jensen, supra note 82, at 624 (“The Supreme Court has described . . . the assignment of income 
doctrine [] as the ‘first principle of income taxation.’ Yet despite its venerable lineage and importance, 
the doctrine remains today beset by confusion and uncertainty.”). 
 103. Palmer v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), aff’d on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 104. Id. at 688. 
 105. Id. at 687. 
 106. Id. at 689. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 689–90. 
 109. Id. at 690. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 691. 
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courts.”112 In an attempt to add clarity to the situation, the Tax Court carefully de-
lineated the contours of the AAI doctrine: 
[a]s a general rule, a taxpayer cannot insulate himself from taxation merely 
by assigning a right to income to another . . . . However, if the entire inter-
est in the property is transferred and the assignor retains no incidence of 
either direct or indirect control, then the tax on the income rests on the 
assignee.113 
The Court then observed: 
“[t]he only question is whether [the taxpayer] really made a gift, thereby 
transferring ownership of the stock prior to the redemption . . . . Even 
though the donor anticipated or was aware that the redemption was immi-
nent, the presence of an actual gift and the absence of an obligation to have 
the stock redeemed have been sufficient to give such gifts independent 
significance.114 
Based on these considerations, the Court concluded that 
[w]hen the foundation received the gift of stock from the petitioner, no 
vote for the redemption had yet been taken. Although we recognize that 
the vote was anticipated, nonetheless . . . that expectation is not enough. In 
these circumstances, at the time of the gift, the redemption had not pro-
ceeded far enough along for us to conclude that the foundation was pow-
erless to reverse the plans of the petitioner. In light of the presence of an 
actual, valid gift . . . we hold that the gift of stock was not in substance a 
gift of the proceeds of redemption.115 
The Palmer case, therefore, stands for the point of law that if the donee receives 
assets with no binding obligation to sell such assets (i.e. “no strings attached”), and 
the donee then sells the property of its own volition, then the Charitable AAI Doc-
trine shall not be used to attribute the gain from such sale back to the donor. This 
rule holds true even if the donor controls both the charitable donee and the entity 
that later purchases the stock. In other words, the same person can contribute prop-
erty to a charity he or she controls and then direct the charity to sell the stock back 
to the company he controls, and not trigger the Charitable AAI doctrine so long as 
the initial gift to the charity was with “no strings attached.” 
The Palmer case by itself may not be all that significant, just a lone decision in 
the sea of the larger AAI doctrine jurisprudence. However, in 1978, four years after 
the Palmer decision was handed down, the IRS adopted Revenue Ruling 78-197.116 
In Revenue Ruling 78-197, the IRS concedes to the decision of the Palmer case and 
 
 112. Id. at 693. 
 113. Id. at 693–94 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 693. 
 115. Id. at 695. 
 116. Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83 (1978). 
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says that it will no longer contest arrangements that are substantially similar to those 
in that case.117 Specifically, Revenue Ruling 78-197 says, in relevant part, that 
[a] taxpayer with voting control of a corporation and an exempt private 
foundation who donates shares of the corporation’s stock to the foundation 
and, pursuant to a prearranged plan, causes the corporation to redeem the 
shares from the foundation does not realize income as a result of the re-
demption. The Service will treat the proceeds as income to the donor under 
facts similar to those in the Palmer decision only if the donee is legally 
bound, or can be compelled by the corporation, to surrender the shares for 
redemption.118 
The IRS was probably tired of fighting this battle over the AAI doctrine and 
purposely set forth the safe harbor outlined above. As long as the donor gives the 
stock to the charity absent a legal obligation to redeem the stock back to the com-
pany, an ensuing redemption of the stock by the charity shall not attribute gain back 
to the donor, even if the donor controls both the charity and the redeeming company. 
While IRS Revenue Rulings are not laws binding on the court, the Tax Court has 
noted that they are binding on the IRS, and so long as Revenue Ruling 78-197 re-
mains in circulation without being changed, the IRS cannot renege on the position 
stated in the Revenue Ruling.119 As the IRS has not yet reversed Revenue Ruling 
78-197, and there is no indication that it will any time soon, this safe harbor from 
the IRS and the Palmer rule appears to be reliable for planning purposes.120 
IV. CLEARING AN OBSTRUCTIVE DOCTRINE 
A. Difficulties with Palmer and the Current Doctrine 
While the Palmer rule is clear enough, the rule is also deeply unsatisfying for 
several reasons. First, in addition to laying out the new rule, Palmer also endorses 
a convoluted form-over-substance strategy for circumventing the rule.121 Drawing 
a distinction between a taxpayer who contributes stock to a charity, subject to a 
binding obligation to redeem the stock, and a taxpayer contributing stock to a char-
ity he controls, with the stock being redeemed by the company the taxpayer controls 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1. 
 119. See Rauenhorst v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 119 T.C. 157, 171 (2002) (“We agree with re-
spondent that revenue rulings are not binding on this Court, or other Federal courts for that matter. How-
ever, we cannot agree that the Commissioner is not bound to follow his revenue rulings in Tax Court 
proceedings. Indeed, we have on several occasions treated revenue rulings as concessions by the Com-
missioner where those rulings are relevant to our disposition of the case.”) 
 120. But see, Blake v. Comm’r Internal Revenue., 42 T.C.M. 1336 (1981), aff’d, 697 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 
1982); Ferguson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 108 T.C. 244 (1997). 
 121. Robert E. Madden and Lisa H.R. Hayes, No Anticipatory Assignment of Income by Making Char-
itable Gift of Stock Warrants Rauenhorst, 119 T.C. 157 (2002), 30 EST. PLAN. 132, 134 (2003) (“[I]n 
the wake of Palmer and Rev. Rul. 78-197, the IRS had taken a relatively liberal position in this area. As 
long as the closely held corporation cannot compel the charity to tender the donated stock for redemption, 
and as long as the stock is redeemed for its fair market value, the IRS would not take a substance-over-
form position and declare the transaction a gift by the taxpayer of redemption proceeds.”). 
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later the same day, ignores the substance of the two transactions and is simply an 
exercise in ridiculous formalism. 
Moreover, the Palmer rule also indirectly endorses other equally absurd form-
over-substance strategies to circumvent the rule. Suppose a taxpayer contributes 
stock to a charity he or she controls. Instead of using the entity to redeem the stock 
out of the charity, the taxpayer offers to buy the stock back from the charity for 
market value.122 As long as the repurchase was not prearranged, it would not violate 
the Palmer rule and the resulting gains would be realized in the tax-exempt entity. 
With this strategy, the taxpayer would raise his or her basis in the stock with the 
repurchase, and the stock could be sold to a third-party buyer according to a prear-
ranged sale with the taxpayer realizing little or no gain due to his or her increased 
basis in the shares. 
The Palmer rule also ignores the fact that the efforts of the donor to prearrange 
the third-party sale actually adds value to the private securities donated to the char-
ity. If a donor contributes a minority position in a company to a charity, the gift may 
be all but worthless. The shares may have an appraised value, which the donor will 
likely be able to take as a charitable deduction, but there would be very little market 
for the shares—making them of little real value to the charity. This relative lack of 
market arises as investors are typically uninterested in buying a minority position 
in a company. Also, depending on shareholder agreements, the charity may not be 
able to sell its shares to a third party without approval from the majority, nor would 
the charity be able to compel the majority to allow the sale. A donor’s effort to 
prearrange a sale for the shares prior to the contribution actually creates a market, 
and adds value to the charitable gift. It seems inappropriate that the Code should 
punish the donor for taking steps to add such value to a charitable gift. 
In this way, the Palmer rule also disadvantages holders of private securities as 
compared to holders of publicly traded securities. A donor may transfer appreciated, 
publicly traded securities to a tax-exempt entity, and that entity may sell them freely 
and realize the gain tax free with no fear of that the Charitable AAI Doctrine will 
ascribe the income to the donor. The tax-exempt entity would not be following 
through on a pre-arranged sale—merely availing itself of an existing market. It 
seems incongruous that the AAI Doctrine should apply to the donation and sale of 
private securities where the donor had to work to establish a market (i.e., the third-
party sale) while the pre-existence of the public market should relieve the donor of 
publicly-traded assets of a similar burden. 
Prohibiting the donor from prearranging a sale may also put the charity into an 
odd sort of double bind. If the donor has not created an effective market to sell the 
shares on, the charity would likely have to hold them. However, the fiduciary con-
trolling a charitable entity has a general obligation to keep the entity’s assets safely 
invested and diversified.123 If a charitable entity receives a concentrated position 
(i.e., a substantial share of stock in a single entity), the fiduciary will rightly seek to 
 
 122. The taxpayer is not concerned with the wash sale rules of I.R.C. § 1091 because the taxpayer is 
not looking to claim a deductible loss with this transaction. Consequently, the contribution and buy-back 
could happen almost instantaneously without a tax repercussion. 
 123. Fiduciaries managing the assets of nonprofit institutions are generally governed by the Prudent 
Investor Acts of the nonprofit’s governing state. Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 3 states “A trustee shall 
diversify the investments of the trust[.]” See also Susan N. Gary, Is it Prudent to be Responsible: The 
Legal Rules for Charities that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW J. 
L. & SOC. POL’Y 106 (2011). 
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liquidate the concentrated position and diversify the proceeds.124 But without a mar-
ket for such shares, the charity has no place to sell them. If a charity is not allowed 
to hold the shares, and it has no place to sell them, its only real option is to decline 
the donation. 
Finally, the Charitable AAI Doctrine makes it all but impossible to effectively 
use the CRUT strategy as part of a business liquidation. For the strategy to work, 
the business owner would either have to contribute his or her shares to the CRUT 
well ahead of the sale or work out a substance-over-form strategy where the con-
tributed stock is redeemed or bought back by the donor. Without such extraordinary 
measures, the shares would have to be appraised prior to contribution to determine 
the CRUT’s distribution and remainder value. The unitrust distributions to the grant 
would likely have to be made at least partly in-kind and based on annual appraisals 
of the CRUT assets. Taking the CRUT strategy away from business owners looking 
to sell exacerbates capital lock-in—a problem the Code otherwise usually seeks to 
solve. 
B. Correcting the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doc-
trine 
The original Earned AAI Doctrine, as stated in Lucas v. Earl, is an effective 
rule for preventing abuses of the income tax and should be codified. The Unearned 
AAI Doctrine of Helvering v. Horst is also an effective rule, and while it may like-
wise be codified (as mentioned supra), it has largely been supplanted by an intricate 
system of tax provisions governing the transfer of productive assets. Consequently, 
it is significantly less urgent for Congress to codify the Unearned AAI Doctrine. 
However, with both of these applications of the Doctrine, codification may have the 
benefits of clarifying the law, creating consistent terminology, strengthening gov-
ernment’s reliance on the rule, and alleviating judicial inconsistency.125 
Conversely, there is no good reason for the AAI Doctrine to apply to any trans-
fers to charities, especially under the tortuous rules created by Palmer. Indeed, the 
Charitable AAI Doctrine is simply an improper mutation of the Unearned AAI Doc-
trine and merely disrupts transactions that are otherwise consistent with policies 
embedded in the Code. It may be true that without the AAI Doctrine applying to 
charitable transfers the Treasury may end up with less total revenue due to expanded 
use of charitable structures. As a general matter, such loss of revenue is contem-
plated by the mere existence and combination of §§ 501 and 170. But to the extent 
the Charitable AAI Doctrine is presently justified by its ability to mitigate loss of 
federal revenue, the Code would be far better served by controlling the availability 
of charitable tax strategies through strengthening existing restrictions in the Code 
or creating appropriate new statutory caps or limitations. 
The prohibition of the Charitable AAI Doctrine in the CRUT context could be 
achieved by adding new, simple language to § 664. The following could be added 
for instance: 
 
 124. A fiduciary of a § 501(c)(3) charitable entity holding shares in a closely-held business may lose 
the entity’s tax-exempt privilege anyway under the unrelated taxable business income rules of I.R.C. § 
512. The CRUT strategy would be taxable on such business income under I.R.C. § 664(c)(2)(A); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(1)(i) (2018). 
 125. Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX 
REV. 579, 621–22 (2014). 
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§ 664(h) No Attribution of Income back to Grantor 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), no income realized by a 
charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust shall 
be taxable to the grantor of such trust. 
Adding this language to § 664 will cure the AAI Doctrine as it relates to the 
CRUT structure for liquidating businesses that is discussed throughout this article. 
But just adding language to § 664 may be a half measure. For a complete cure 
to the Charitable AAI Doctrine, new language should also be added to the Code that 
entirely erases the Doctrine from the charitable landscape. The most natural place 
to add such a wide-ranging correction is likely Part III of Subchapter B, pertaining 
to Items Specifically Excluded from Gross Income for purposes of the Income Tax 
under Subtitle A. The new exclusion preventing application of the Charitable AAI 
Doctrine could be codified as a new § 139H, which might simply state: 
§ 139H. Income realized by entity exempt from taxation 
Gross income does not include any amount received by, realized by, or 
paid or incurred to any entity that is exempt from taxation under this sub-
title. 
This rough statement of the rule welcomes elaboration and clarification. Addi-
tionally, Congress could add language allowing inclusion of income to a taxpayer 
in extenuating circumstances, such as in the case of fraudulent transfers or other 
specifically listed abuses. If Congress deems Part III of Subchapter B inappropriate 
for a new general exclusion meant to counter an existing judicial doctrine, the Code 
could be amended by adding new language to §§ 501 or 170. Wherever it may be 
added, a correction for the Charitable AAI Doctrine will remove an unnecessary 
obstacle to sound and consistent use of established tax policies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Code expresses myriad policy preferences through its tax expenditures. 
Though these preferences may blend together into complex tangles of Code sec-
tions, the policies that underlie these preferences and sections remain remarkably 
consistent. One clear policy of the Code is to assist business owners in the liquida-
tion of their businesses, thus limiting capital lock-in and encouraging business 
growth and continuity. Another clear policy is to encourage philanthropic gifts to 
non-profit organizations, thus supporting charitable organizations and their altruis-
tic purposes. It is also clear that, though these policy preferences are important and 
arguably worth continuing in the Code, no expenditure is absolute. Limitations to 
tax expenditures, such as caps and phase-outs, are effective and appropriate ways 
to prevent tax expenditures from swallowing the nation’s ability to collect tax rev-
enue. 
The CRUT liquidation strategy outlined in this article is an effective way of 
meeting both policy goals of helping an entrepreneur liquidate his or her business 
and supporting charitable institutions. In fact, if executed correctly, the CRUT 
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liquidation strategy can return more on the sale of a business to its owner in the long 
run than an outright sale, provide a lifetime stream of income to the sellers, and 
leave a remainder value to a charity that may not have otherwise been considered. 
Everyone wins with the CRUT structure. Moreover, normal restraints on tax pref-
erences for charitable structures, especially those found in IRC § 664, are appropri-
ate limitations that allow the structure to meet the policy preferences underlying this 
tax expenditure while preventing it from being used in an abusive manner. 
Unfortunately, the CRUT structure for business liquidation is largely ineffec-
tive due to the judicially-created and imprudently-warped Anticipatory Assignment 
of Income Doctrine. While the AAI Doctrine may be a reasonable limitation in cer-
tain circumstances, applying the Doctrine to charitable gifts, especially in the con-
text of business liquidation, is not appropriate. In these circumstances, the AAI 
Doctrine serves only to stifle charitable contributions, exacerbate capital lock-in, 
and potentially lead to numerous inefficiencies and inequities. Rather than serve as 
a reasonable cap or restriction on tax expenditures, the AAI Doctrine now serves to 
frustrate otherwise valuable transactions the Code should be encouraging. The frus-
tration of the AAI Doctrine is well known and there are work-arounds to its ob-
structions. However, even these judicially created workarounds are problematic as 
they promote bizarre form over substance fictions that add costs and risks to liqui-
dation structures. Instead of solving the problem, these artless workarounds merely 
accentuate the absurdity of the Doctrine itself. 
The answer to this problem is to codify the Anticipatory Assignment of Income 
Doctrine in its proper context of income shifts between taxable persons, and ex-
pressly prohibit the Doctrine from applying in the charitable setting. In fact, the 
Doctrine has largely been codified into its proper place through mechanisms such 
as joint tax returns, the kiddie tax, the gift tax, and other provisions that give statu-
tory life to its original purpose. Now, it simply remains to excise the Doctrine from 
the charitable context. With proper legislation, Congress can free charitable struc-
tures and strategies from the Anticipatory Assignment of Income Doctrine and al-
low taxpayers to pursue these beneficial structures unobstructed. 
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End of Year Net 
Owner Value Year 
End of Year Net 
Owner Value
Net Value to Charity 
(Upon Termination)
Total Net Value 
(Owner + Charity)
7,968,386.40$      1 911,754.34$          9,403,472.00$           10,315,226.34$         
8,332,701.03$      2 1,810,805.38$       8,842,528.57$           10,653,333.95$         
8,713,672.12$      3 2,699,816.78$       8,315,046.98$           11,014,863.76$         
9,112,061.21$      4 3,581,380.42$       7,819,031.14$           11,400,411.56$         
9,528,664.64$      5 4,458,024.68$       7,352,604.04$           11,810,628.73$         
9,964,315.19$      6 5,332,222.43$       6,914,000.62$           12,246,223.06$         
10,419,883.68$    7 6,206,398.65$       6,501,561.13$           12,707,959.78$         
10,896,280.76$    8 7,082,937.85$       6,113,724.80$           13,196,662.65$         
11,394,458.72$    9 7,964,191.28$       5,749,024.00$           13,713,215.28$         
11,915,413.37$    10 8,852,483.86$       5,406,078.62$           14,258,562.48$         
12,460,186.07$    11 9,750,120.98$       5,083,590.89$           14,833,711.88$         
13,029,865.78$    12 10,659,395.12$     4,780,340.46$           15,439,735.58$         
13,625,591.24$    13 11,582,592.28$     4,495,179.77$           16,077,772.05$         
14,248,553.28$    14 12,521,998.36$     4,227,029.71$           16,749,028.07$         
14,899,997.13$    15 13,479,905.39$     3,974,875.55$           17,454,780.94$         
15,581,225.00$    16 14,458,617.67$     3,737,763.10$           18,196,380.76$         
16,293,598.61$    17 15,460,457.84$     3,514,795.06$           18,975,252.90$         
17,038,541.94$    18 16,487,772.94$     3,305,127.69$           19,792,900.63$         
17,817,544.07$    19 17,542,940.36$     3,107,967.57$           20,650,907.94$         
18,632,162.19$    20 18,628,373.89$     2,922,568.60$           21,550,942.49$         
19,484,024.64$    21 19,746,529.60$     2,748,229.20$           22,494,758.81$         
20,374,834.25$    22 20,899,911.93$     2,584,289.64$           23,484,201.56$         
21,306,371.67$    23 22,091,079.63$     2,430,129.52$           24,521,209.15$         
22,280,498.99$    24 23,322,651.90$     2,285,165.49$           25,607,817.39$         
23,299,163.40$    25 24,597,314.50$     2,148,848.97$           26,746,163.47$         
24,364,401.15$    26 25,917,825.96$     2,020,664.12$           27,938,490.07$         
25,478,341.57$    27 27,287,023.89$     1,900,125.84$           29,187,149.73$         
26,643,211.35$    28 28,707,831.42$     1,786,778.02$           30,494,609.43$         
27,861,338.97$    29 30,183,263.73$     1,680,191.70$           31,863,455.43$         
29,135,159.39$    30 31,716,434.75$     1,579,963.56$           33,296,398.32$         
Comparison of Net Value to Owner and Charity
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